Bellairs Workshop on Multi-Agent Systems

Sunday, March 26th (BernieFest)

8:00–9:00		Breakfast	
9:00–10:00		**Rahul Savani** Liverpool	Selected Contributions of Bernhard von Stengel at 60
10:00–10:15		Break	
10:15–11:15		**Ilan Adler** Berkeley	The Equivalence of LP and Zero-Sum Games: Past, Present, and Future
11:15–11:30		Break	
11:30–1:00		**Open Problem Session** #1	Bring Open Problems!
1:00–5:00		Collaborative Research Time (and Lunch)	
5:00–6:00		Welcome Reception	
6:00–7:00		Dinner	
7:00-8:15		**Bernhard von Stengel** LSE	Beautiful Open Multi-Agent Problems and Some Solution Attempts
8:15–		BernieFest	

Monday, March 27th (A Congested Day)

8:00–9:00		Breakfast	
9:00–9:30		**Martin Gairing** Liverpool	Optimal Taxes in Atomic Congestion Games
9:30–10:00		**Tobias Harks** Passau	Side-constrained Dynamic Traffic Equilibria
10:00–10:15		Break	
10:15–10:45		**Herve Moulin** Glasgow	The Congested Assignment Problem
10:45–11:15		**Sean Horan** Montréal	Choice Functions in the context of Market Design
11:15–11:45		**Sanjukta Roy** Penn State	Fractional Matching: Stability and Optimality
11:45–6:00		Collaborative Research Time (and Lunch)	
6:00–7:00		Dinner	
7:00-8:15		**Edith Elkind** Oxford	Certifiable Justified Representation

Tuesday, March 28th ('Tis Optimization Day)

8:00–9:00	Breakfast		
9:00–9:30		**Ioannis Caragiannis** Aarhus	Computing better Approximate Pure Nash equilibria in Cut Games via Semidefinite Programming
9:30–10:00		**Alexandra Lassota** EPFL	Sparse Integer Programs and How to Use Them
10:00–10:15	Break		
10:15–10:45		**Mete Ahunbay** TU Munich	(Type-independent) CCE of Symmetric Auctions seem Close to Symmetric Equilibria
10:45–11:15		**Katerina Papadaki** LSE	Multiagent Learning and Equilibrium in Pricing Games
11:15–11:45		**Jason Hartline** Northwestern	Mechanisms for a No-Regret Agent: Beyond the Common Prior
11:45–12:00	Break		
12:00–1:00		**Open Problem Session** #2	Bring Open Problems!
12:30–6:00	Collaborative Research Time (and Lunch)		
6:00–7:00	Dinner		
7:00-8:15		**Costis Daskalakis** MIT	How to Play an Infinite Game?

Wednesday, March 29th (A Day at the Fair)

8:00–9:00	Breakfast		
9:00–9:30		**Vishnu Narayan** Tel-Aviv	Breaking the Envy Cycle: Best-of-Both-Worlds Guarantees for Subadditive Valuations.
9:30–10:00		**Alexandros Hollender** EPFL	Envy-Free Cake-Cutting for Four Agents
10:00–10:15	Break		
10:15–10:45		**April Niu** McGill	Fair Algorithm Design: Fair and Efficacious Machine Scheduling
10:45–11:15		**Max Klimm** TU Berlin	Impartial Selection with Additive Guarantees via Iterated Deletion
11:15–11:45		**Hannaneh Akrami** MPI	Breaking the 3/4 Barrier for Approximate Maximin Share
11:45–6:00	Collaborative Research Time (and Lunch)		
6:00–7:00	Dinner		
7:00-8:15		**Jugal Garg** Urbana-Champaign	Finding Fair and Efficient Allocations

Thursday, March 30th (Apps et al. Day)

8:00–9:00	**Breakfast**		
9:00–9:30		**Daniel Halpern** Harvard	Analyzing Community Discussion Tools: a Committee Selection Problem
9:30–10:00		**Evi Micha** Toronto	Welfare-Maximizing Pooled Testing
10:00–10:30		**Taylor Lundy** UBC	Monetizing Impatience in Mobile Games
10:30–10:45	**Break**		
10:45–11:15		**Daniel Schoepflin** Drexel	Deterministic Budget-feasible Clock Auctions
11:15–11:45		**Dana Pizarro** O' Higgins	Dynamic Resource Constrained Reward Collection Problems: Unified Model and Analysis
11:45–12:15		**Clayton Thomas** Princeton	Strategyproofness-Exposing Mechanism Descriptions
12:15–6:30	**Collaborative Research Time (and Lunch)**		
6:30–	**Workshop Banquet**		